

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destruction.

Defensive operations of troops which are allocated for cover during the repelling of a sudden enemy incursion can assume the most varied proportions. On certain axes, covering forces alone may prove to be insufficient for accomplishing a given task. Changing the balance of forces on all axes of the enemy offensive by employing nuclear weapons or other means of destruction within short periods of time may also be unsuccessful. For this reason, it is not out of the question in a number of instances to allocate a part or all of the forces of the first echelon, and possibly the second echelon of one or several armies to carry out tasks of repelling an enemy incursion and of defending the national border. It follows from this that along with the planning of offensive operations and the allocation of a part of the forces to cover the movement forward and deployment of troops, the practical necessity for advance planning (as an alternate variant) of defensive operations for armies of the first echelon of fronts, and possibly for the front as a whole, also arises. The recognition of such a necessity would be quite in line with the officially accepted theoretical position according to which it is considered possible for a part of the forces to go over to the defense at the beginning of a war when an unfavorable situation is developing for an offensive on one axis or another.

For example, such an unfavorable situation may develop for our ground forces on individual axes in the event the enemy delivers a massed preemptive nuclear strike as a result of which troops of one front or another may suffer considerable losses, particularly in respect to nuclear warheads and the means for their delivery. In addition, the enemy, having exploited the element of surprise, can undertake an incursion with all the combat-ready groupings of his ground forces during a nuclear strike. In such an unfavorable situation, individual operational formations (army or front) will be forced at the very beginning of combat actions to conduct defensive operations in order to disrupt an incursion by superior enemy forces, thereby creating conditions for subsequently going over to the offensive.

As a result of simultaneous delivery of the initial nuclear strikes by the sides, another situation may arise, as a result  $_{\rm 0.0X1-HUM}$  which both sides will be forced temporarily to go over to the

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defense on individual axes. The fact is that, under these conditions, the adversaries will be occupied with eliminating the aftereffects of the employment of weapons of mass destruction in order to restore the combat effectiveness of their troops if their condition does not allow them immediately or as soon as possible to form attack groupings, having even limited strength, for going over to a decisive offensive. Such a situation is quite probable on an army and even on a front scale and may arise on a number of the most important axes of the theater of military Before managing to prepare for going over to the offensive and before ascertaining the capabilities for conducting it on one axis or another, the surviving forces may be required to organize a defense in order to accomplish the tasks of repelling a possible enemy incursion if he is able to bring his forces and means to readiness earlier for the conduct of offensive actions.

Evidently, it is from precisely such positions that we must approach the problem of determining the possibility of forced employment of defense on an army and <u>front</u> scale at the very beginning of a strategic operation when the enemy is initiating military operations employing nuclear weapons.

When a war is unleashed with only conventional means of destruction, on individual axes of an offensive of large enemy groupings it may prove necessary to conduct army defensive operations simultaneously with the offensive of the main forces of one's own fronts on other axes. If, however, the enemy succeeds in creating a considerable superiority of forces and means (particularly in aviation and tanks as well as in artillery) for an incursion into the zone of one of the fronts, then that front will be forced, with a significant part of the first-echelon forces or with all of its forces, to first conduct a defensive operation, and then, having repelled the enemy incursion, to go over to the offensive to defeat his opposing groupings in cooperation with adjacent advancing fronts and formations (large units) of other branches of the armed forces.

The necessity of a forced going over by an army or front to the defense during an offensive operation either with or without the employment of nuclear weapons, obviously may arise as the result of an unsuccessful outcome of meeting engagements or if it bad failed to disrupt a counterattack being prepared by a large

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enemy grouping, as well as under conditions when troops had been subjected to intense enemy nuclear weapons activity and had sustained great losses, ruling out the possibility of continuing the offensive. One of the reasons for troops of an operational formation going over to the defense during a period of nuclear actions may also be a temporary shortage of nuclear warheads for the destruction of a large enemy counterattack grouping, since the main efforts are concentrated on defeating it and developing an offensive on other axes.


Speaking of the conditions for conducting defensive operations during an offensive, yet another possible variant of the forced conduct of a defense on an operational scale must be considered. This may occur at the time of transition from non-nuclear actions to limited or mass employment of nuclear weapons. It is not out of the question that the enemy on that or some other axis may gain an advantage in time of delivery and in the yield of the initial nuclear strike delivered by operational-tactical means, and means that he will be able to regain the initiative as a result of an abrupt change in the situation and in the balance of forces in his favor.

Along with forced conditions, in a number of instances it may prove expedient to deliberately go over to the defense prior to the beginning of or during combat actions, in particular, on ocean or open seacoasts where it is possible for the enemy to conduct a landing and operations of large amphibious and airborne landing forces, as well as in difficult to negotiate mountainous, desert or marshy-woodland axes of theaters of military operations, or when, for military-political reasons, an offensive is not contemplated, but border military conflicts are possible. In other words, a deliberate transition to the defense on an operational scale will take place first of all on secondary axes and theaters of military operations.

However, we would also permit a deliberate going over to the defense in a border zone during a period of threat on certain major axes of the main theater, especially when the balance of forces which is forming up does not favor going over to a decisive offensive at the beginning of war. For example, in a similar situation the troops of the "western" front worked on going over to the defense during the DNEPR exercise.


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The distinctive	e features of deliberately undertaken
defensive operations preliminary preparate peacetime, and the reperiod of threat or completely different during a strategic especially under the weapons, strikes by	s lie in the fact that their planning and tion are accomplished ahead of time, in necessary refinements are introduced in the as combat actions begin. There will be conditions for organization of the defense operation in a theater of military operations influence of enemy nuclear and chemical his aviation and groupings of ground forces cis, by his naval forces.
after a sudden enemy defensive operation the retaliatory nucli incursion by forces transition to the dethe movement of trocconcentration areas conditions for prepalikely be the most of first of all, by a cinitiation of nucleatroop losses resultinguisticient reading for participation in substantial change in	Front is forced to go over to the defense nuclear attack, then preparation of the can go on simultaneously with the delivery of lear strike and repelling of the enemy of the covering troops, whereas the efense itself can go on simultaneously with the ops from permanent deployment points and from upon alert or from waiting areas. Such complex. This complexity may be occasioned, completely new situation caused by the car war, by the possibility of considerable and from the aggressor's nuclear attack, by eas of part of the operational-tactical means the initial nuclear strike, as well as by a confidency operation on that axis may have
for achieving success while taking basic property for example, moving state border to take disadvantageous. It units to go over to distance from the bottoops, the first to	ditions, one of the most important factors is in an operation is the gaining of time preparatory measures. In a number of cases, troops forward directly to a line on the up a defense may prove to be may be possible for first-echelon large the defense upon a favorable line at some order. In this case, the actions of covering begin repelling a sudden incursion by enemyings, allow for a gaining of time to prepare a
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; ;	counterattack by forward units begins are unfavorable for the organization of a defense by the main forces of the army. We must suppose that sometimes it is to our advantage to have a forward security zone formed by forward units (detachments) not only in a division, but on an army scale as well. It seems to us that this question merits study during the operational and combat training of troops.
	Large units of the second echelon usually are assigned primary and alternate areas of disposition, areas (lines) of defense in the operational depth, several axes for counterattacks upon each of which lines of deployment are designated, and movement routes and siting areas for missile battalions and artillery also are prepared. We can agree with such a proposition when it is viewed as a variant. In our view, in the majority of cases, it is more to the advantage of second-echelon large units to specify immediately the zones of defense on the most important axes of the enemy offensive. If these divisions are assigned disposition areas alone, then the troops may be insufficiently prepared for repelling the attack of enemy groupings which have broken through on the lines which they will have to occupy during the operation.
3 1 3 3	In view of the necessity of establishing a deeply echeloned defense capable of withstanding massed strikes by nuclear weapons and other enemy means of destruction, as well as an offensive by superior groupings of his ground forces, particularly armored troops, it is desirable to restore such an element of the structure of an operational defense as defensive lines in all situations in which defensive operations are being conducted. They can be called army and front defensive lines since they are set up in the operational depth by large units of the second echelon or reserve of an army or front.
o a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a a	Depending upon the importance of the defended axis, the objectives and concept of the defensive operation, the strength of one's own forces and means and of the attacking enemy, and also the terrain conditions, several of these lines may be designated and prepared. The distance between them and the manner in which they are drawn both differ greatly. In establishing one to two army lines and one to two front lines, their overall depth in the army's zone of defense may reach 100 to 150 kilometers, whereas in the front's zone their depth may



In a defense, observation of the principle of efficient use of nuclear means, i.e., employing them at the most decisive moments of the operation, acquires particular importance. If, for example, single nuclear strikes against an advancing, deploying or attacking enemy prove to be advantageous -- from the point of view of weakening his main groupings, of delaying their offensive and of gaining time for strengthening the defense on the threatened axes -- then, of course, they must be delivered. But if the effectiveness of such single strikes will not be sufficient, then it is better to save the available nuclear warheads until a specified time and use them together with those newly brought up to inflict more substantial destruction upon an attacking enemy by conducting a grouped or massed nuclear strike at decisive moments in the defensive operation, for example, when delivering a counterattack.

Nuclear minefields may prove to be a highly effective means for destroying the enemy during defensive operations. It is


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mine depl secu the cour	sible to lay them in the form of single nuclear mines (land es), clusters or sectors (lines) on the probable axes of oyment and attack of the main enemy groupings in the forward arity zone, in front of the forward edge, on the flanks and in depth of one's own defense, taking into consideration, of ese, their radius of destruction caused by all the elements of burst with a view to the safety of one's own troops.

The methods of conducting defensive operations and defeating attacking enemy groupings will be determined in each specific instance by the objectives of the operation, by the conditions for going over to the defense (perforce or deliberately, while under enemy strikes or beforehand, with or without employing nuclear weapons), by the degree of destruction of the enemy with strategic or front means, by the strength and the combat capabilities of the front or army, and by the nature of their cooperation with attacking operational formations. They will also depend on the strength of the groupings, the capabilities and the nature of the actions of the attacking enemy.

We must consider the principal method for conducting a defensive operation of a <u>front</u> or army during nuclear actions to be the destruction of attacking enemy groupings with nuclear and chemical weapons and with fire from conventional means in conjunction with the firm holding of areas which are most important in an operational sense and with the conduct of decisive counterattacks following nuclear strikes.

Accordingly, the defeat of enemy groupings may be achieved by delivering strikes with means of mass destruction in conjunction with those made by conventional means when these groupings are moving forward, when they are being deployed on the line of commitment to battle or when they are in the departure area for the offensive. For this purpose, a strike by the combined-arms large units forward of the front of defense may be delivered under favorable circumstances following the nuclear, chemical and fire strikes, or else a counterattack by the second echelons of the army or front may be launched against the penetrating enemy groupings.

The application of one or another method, or a combination  $_{50\rm X1-HUM}$  thereof, to defeat an attacking enemy must lead in the end to a substantial amount of destruction being inflicted upon him, to a





his destruction with counterattacks, counterthrusts and by going over to the offensive. Successive destruction inflicted upon enemy groupings during each period of his offensive can and must lead in the final analysis to its disruption and to the creation of conditions for defeating the enemy in subsequent aggressive offensive operations.

Such an approach to the problem of disrupting an offensive during a defensive operation in the non-nuclear period is based on the fact that when conducting combat actions employing conventional means of destruction alone, it is impossible to achieve a drastic change in the balance of forces in one's favor in a short period of time, meaning, therefore, that any talk of disrupting an enemy offensive as a result of delivering one powerful strike or by conducting some one-phase actions of defending troops is out of the question. What is more, one cannot count on the disruption of an enemy offensive in preparation.

It is possible to approach the problem of disrupting an enemy offensive in the period of nuclear actions quite differently. The massed employment of nuclear weapons by the means of a defending formation and a higher command level allows such destruction to be inflicted upon enemy groupings which are preparing for or conducting an offensive, as a result of which he will be forced to discontinue it. Thus, with one powerful nuclear weapons strike and through one-phase actions of troops following it, the achievement of an abrupt, favorable change in the balance of forces and, consequently, a disruption of the enemy offensive, are possible.

In so doing, conditions for the disruption of an enemy offensive may, in principle, be created during any period of the operation. But this will depend, first of all, on the capabilities of a defending front or army for inflicting decisive destruction upon main enemy groupings with nuclear weapons, on the capabilities for employing nuclear weapons with strategic means against these groupings, on the timely destruction of enemy means of nuclear attack, and also on the degree of support given to defending troops by adjacent attacking operational formations. Accordingly, the following are of no little importance: decisive maneuvering of missile/nuclear means for delivering strikes against an advancing enemy, the selection of the moment at which

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